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 Battered Women: Loss of Control and Lost Opportunities 
Amanda Clough 
Abstract: Battered women who kill their abuser and the problem they create in regards to access to 
justice has been discussed for many years by many academics. The English legal system has 
attempted to update partial defences to murder to remedy the situation, through the abolition of 
the problematic and gendered provocation defence, replacing it with another based upon loss of 
control contained within the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This work considers these updates, how 
effective they may be, and considers through comparative analysis with other jurisdictions if other 
solutions are available, and how English law should proceed. 
Key Words: Murder, loss of control, battered women, partial defences, manslaughter, comparative 
reform options 
I. Introduction 
The issue of battered women who kill was unarguably one of the most compelling reasons for 
replacing the law of provocation in England and Wales.1 The new defence contained in the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 is the first attempt made to give these women an adequate defence to murder, 
albeit partial. In order to understand if these issues have been resolved by the new provisions,2 it is 
important to recognise the problems the provocation defence caused for such cases, and question if 
there were other, more appropriate, avenues for change. For example, by considering the efforts 
made by other jurisdictions to address the problem battered women who kill present. This work will 
consider these routes to justice in such cases of self-preservation, and question if the partial defence 
of loss of control is the solution it claims to be, with recommendations for more suitable reform. 
Battered women who kill their abuser, often in non-confrontational circumstances, has long been 
discussed, debated and deliberated over.3 It is the assumption being made by the defendant in such 
cases that is most problematic; in a pre-emptive attack, how can we be sure there would have been 
further violence? Even with self-defence, we are dealing with actions that are “inherently 
                                                          
1 See generally Susan Edwards, “Mr Justice Devlin’s Legacy: Duffy – a Battered Woman “Caught” In Time” 
(2009) 12 Criminal Law Review 851; Celia Wells, “Provocation: The Case For Abolition” Chapter 6, Barry 
Mitchell and Andrew Ashworth, Rethinking English Homicide Law ( Oxford University Press, 2000) 87 
2 Both Edwards and Norrie, for example, speculate that they have not, Susan Edwards, “Anger and Fear as 
Justifiable Preludes For Loss of Self-Control” (2010) 74 Journal of Criminal Law 223; Alan Norrie, “The Coroner’s 
and Justice Act 2009 – Partial Defences To Murder (1) Loss Of Control” (2010) 4 Criminal Law Review 275 
3 Elizabeth Kenny, “Battered Women Who Kill: The Fight Against Patriarchy” (2007) 13 UCL Justice Review 17; 
Amanda Clough, “Loss of Control as a Defence: The Key to Replacing Provocation” (2010) 74 Journal of 
Criminal Law 118; Susan Edwards, “Descent Into Murder: Provocation’s Structure – The Prognosis For Women 
Who Kill Men Who Abuse Them” (2007) 71 Journal Criminal Law 342 
predictive”, and so seeking to excuse of justify her actions proves difficult.4 Of course, it would seem 
that deeming these women murderers is completely inappropriate; but no complete or partial 
defence seemed to cover them in even a remotely adequate manner before the attempts made by 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.5 Their plight would mostly fall short of the rules of self-defence, 
because battered women who kill their abuser tend to act when no immediate physical threat is 
present. Diminished responsibility would deem them irrational beings, which is an erroneous label to 
apply to such situations.6 The most likely candidate did seem to be the partial defence of 
provocation. However, even this defence was impractical for the circumstances of these cases, and a 
great driver in its abolition and replacement. We must remember that battered women killing their 
abuser have not created a problem in the law; they have simply prompted us to consider problems 
with the law which have always existed.7 
To explore the issues surrounding battered women who kill, one must ask not only what problems 
they have experienced in the past in trying to defend their actions under the old law, but what other 
solutions have been applied to the problem, not only in this jurisdiction but others too.8 This work 
theorises how a battered woman might use the partial defence of loss of control, and aims to 
challenge two misconceptions. The first is that the fear of serious violence trigger to the new partial 
defence provides an adequate pathway for battered women who kill to have murder reduced to 
manslaughter. The second is that it is this first qualifying trigger alone which is applicable to cases of 
battered women who kill their abuser. From a theory demonstrating their heightened sense of fear 
to the acceptance of cumulative provocation, the road to justice in this area of the law has been a 
long one.9 The aim of this article is to deduce if we are at the destination yet, based on how 
satisfactorily the new partial defence of loss of control will deal with battered women who kill after a 
prolonged period of abuse. 
II. The Problem 
                                                          
4 Kimberley Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defence” (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 711, 715 
5 See (n.3) 
6 As Edwards has noted, abused women should not be constructed in court through a psychological prism, 
Susan Edwards, (n.3) p346 
7 The provocation defence was always a concession to anger-related killings, and has long attracted criticism 
due to its various components, before the most famous of battered women who kill cases came to light in the 
early 1990s. See case comment ‘You Started It’ (1989) 62 Police Journal 343; case comment ‘Provocation – Not 
Part of Defence’ (1989) Criminal Law Review 831 
8 For example, Queensland’s partial defence Killing for Preservation in an abusive domestic relationship, 
contained within Queensland Criminal Code Act 1889, section 304B 
9 The first notable case of a battered women who killed her abuser being convicted of murder is that of Duffy 
[1949] 1 All ER 932, over 65 years ago 
One of the biggest problems with the old provocation partial defence was its gender-biased nature, 
resulting in many women being denied access to legally relevant defences.10 Most notably; the 
defence lending itself towards men acting out of anger. Women acting out of fear and desperation 
were left without adequate protection from a murder conviction and accompanying mandatory life 
sentence. In particular, the most significant problems to emerge were cases of battered women 
killing their abuser. The early 1990’s saw a stream of appeal cases involving women acting in such 
circumstances11. In most cases, the appeals were allowed and the murder verdict was substituted for 
one of manslaughter, although not necessarily on grounds of provocation. This situation was not 
unique to English law. A Canadian judge’s report found cause for concern noting that some women 
serving life sentences may have actually killed in self-defence, with some entering a guilty plea due 
to feeling remorseful rather than based on the merits of the case.12 Regardless of that, it seemed 
that finally, in English law, the plight of the battered woman killing in a final and desperate act of 
self-preservation was being noticed13.  
The reason as to why women in such cases had not originally been convicted of manslaughter 
stemmed from various components of s3 of the Homicide Act 1957, barring them access to a 
successful partial defence plea of provocation. Not only was a loss of self-control mandatory, but the 
objective element to the defence required that a reasonable person might have taken the same 
actions.14 Add to this the “suddenness” requirement that remained good law since the case of 
Duffy15, and the situation for battered women was unfair and capricious. As Hemming has asserted: 
“Why Should the Defence of provocation put a premium on homicidally violent anger 
through the requirement to have lost self-control?”16 
Each case of battered women killing their abuser is unique, but there is much common ground. For 
example, the outwardly calm manner displayed by the woman when she commits the fatal act. She 
does not necessarily go berserk or wild, and she does not fly at him in a rage17. She most likely does 
                                                          
10 Rebecca Bromwich “Defending Battered Women on Trial” (2014) 5 Western Journal of Legal Studies 3, 9 
11 See Thornton (No1) [1992] 1 All ER 306, Thornton (No2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023, Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889, 
Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752, Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008.  
12 Judge Lynn Ratushny Report on Sentencing for Manslaughter in Cases Involving Intimate Relationships, 
Department of Justice Canada, March 2003 @84 
13 Although the first important case where such issues were discussed was  long before this – see Duffy [1949] 
1 All ER 932 
14 Homicide Act 1957 s3 states “the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man 
do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury” 
15 Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932, despite being left out of the wording of the act eight years later 
16 Andrew Hemming, “A Totally Flawed Defence That Has No Place InAustralian Criminal Law Irrespective of 
Sentencing Regime” (2010) 14 University of Western Sydney Law Review 1, 18 
17 See Kenny (n.3) 
not even act during a confrontation18. She might wait until he is sleeping19. She might arm herself20. 
These things negate both the ‘suddenness’ and the loss of self-control requirements without much 
more thought. In relation to the objective test, it would be difficult for a jury to say that she acted 
the way a reasonable person would have without any immediate threat; without any final 
provocative act. Unless the reasonable person had been subject to prolonged abuse, and could 
therefore accurately predict a violent episode, they would be highly unlikely to attack a person as 
they slept. She is therefore deemed irrational. On closer inspection we can see that such cases 
cannot be taken at face value. What is actually happening is a very different state of affairs. Possibly, 
her response is a slow-burn reaction to the straw that broke the camel’s back, and rather than the 
time between the last provocative act and the fatal act being one of cooling down and reflection, it 
may well have been a period of heating up as her fear and anger consume her. Immediate threat is 
also a concept open to interpretation, as we shall discuss. Convicting battered women who kill their 
abuser could readily be said to be, in reality, the result of the state’s failure to protect women 
leaving an abusive relationship.21 
 Another problem was the courts’ reluctance to adequately accommodate the domestic violence 
history22. After all, the history of such a case reads much the same as a history of violence and 
turbulent affairs.23 One answer could be for these women to try and use the diminished 
responsibility defence24, but it seems unfair to try and compel these women to say they are not 
rational beings25. Why should they be labelled sick or unstable for defending their physical and 
emotional selves?26 
The law had seemed to make some minor progress with the early 1990’s appeal cases, mostly by 
bringing their predicament to the courts’ attention, but the fact remained that the cases of battered 
women killing their abusers were still being shoe-horned into a defence which was much more 
                                                          
18 If she did, the complete defence of self-defence would most likely be successful 
19 See Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889. In this case the defendant waited until her husband was sleeping before 
pouring petrol over his feet and setting it alight. 
20 See Thornton (No1) [1992] 1 All ER 306. Sarah Thornton fetched a knife from the kitchen before returning to 
her partner in the living room. 
21 Debra Parkes and Emma Cunliffe“Women and Wrongful Convictions: Concepts and Challenges” (2015) 11 
International Journal of Law in Context 219 @224 
22 Rebecca Bradfield, “Women Who Kill: Lack of Intent and Diminished Responsibility As The Other Defences To 
Spousal Homicide” (2001) 13 Current Issues Criminal Justice 143 
23 Alex Kirsta, Deadlier Than The Male: Violence and Aggression in Women (London, HarperCollins, 1994) 
24 Previously accommodated by Homicide Act 1957, s2 
25 See John Gardner, ‘The Mark of Responsibility’ (2003), 23 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 157 
26 Kirsta (n. 23) 192 
readily associated with anger27. Above all, the requirement of an outward display of loss of self-
control was wholly inconsistent with the traits of fear and despair. There was a progression from the 
Duffy suddenness requirement to a slow-born response, which was a small victory. As Kirsta has 
noted: 
“They may be slower to arouse to anger, but once enraged the fire may smoulder and burn 
longer”28 
 This was still a far stretch from accommodating the desperate emotions felt. This development was 
described by Yeo as a movement towards allowing an eruption of loss of control rather than an 
instant reaction to provocative conduct29; providing an instructive interpretation of practical reality. 
Alongside these cases of battered women which were reaching the headlines, instances of 
provocation being accepted in cases of male defendants over the most trivial of matters made for an 
unjust backdrop to compare against the predicament of battered women. For example, in 1991, 
Joseph McGrail was found guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of provocation and given a 
suspended sentence. He killed the victim, his partner of ten years, by kicking, punching and beating 
her. She was an alcoholic who could be violent on occasion, and in his judgment Justice Popplewell 
claimed that the victim would have tried the patience of a saint.30 This occurred two days after the 
failed appeal of Sara Thornton, a woman routinely and cruelly subject to physical and mental abuse. 
Equally as appalling, in 1987, Thomas Corlett killed his wife and was sentenced to a mere three year 
imprisonment for manslaughter by reason of provocation after she put the mustard on the wrong 
side of his dinner plate.31 In the most heinous of circumstances, Nicholas Boyce killed his wife for 
nagging him in 1985. After the fatal act, he then proceeded to dismember her body. He cooked parts 
so that it would not look like human flesh, before dumping it in several bags around London. 
Provocation was accepted, and his sentence was a meagre six year custodial sentence.32 Sentences 
have at times been lenient for battered women, or at least reduced upon appeal,33 but this kind of 
regard for the nonsensical reasons men have often given as provoking conduct shows the doctrinal 
hindrance the partial defence of provocation had become. 
                                                          
27 The loss of self-control concept meshes well with outward displays of anger rather than emotions such as 
fear and despair 
28 Kirsta (n.23) 200 
29 Stanley Yeo, “The Role of Gender In The Law Of Provocation” (1997) 26 Anglo-American Law Review 431, 
437 
30 See www.bbc.co.uk 29th July 2008, accessed 4th august 2014 and Kirsta (n.23) 195 
31 See www.theguardian.com 25th July 2008, accessed 4th august 2014 and Kirsta (n.23) 195 
32 www.theguardian.com 10th Sept 2007, accessed 4th august 2014 and Kirsta (n.23) 196 
33 For example, in the case of Gardner (1993) 14 Cr App R 364, the defendants 5 year custodial sentence was 
reduced to a probation order. She was convicted of manslaughter by reason of provocation after killing her 
abusive partner during an altercation in which he attacked her and hit her head against the door frame. 
Contrasting the facts of the above cases to the stark realities of the lives of battered women who 
have killed their abuser shows the reality of the provocation problem. Amelia Rossiter had endured 
sexual abuse and threats from her husband, such as that he would garrotte her.34 On the day she 
killed him, he had hit her with a rolling pin. She was initially convicted of murder, although this was 
substituted for manslaughter on appeal. Emma Humphreys was treated as a prostitute, beaten 
routinely, and subject to humiliation and excessive taunting after attempting to commit suicide. On 
the night she killed her abuser she feared he was going to force her to have intercourse with him 
and others.35 Kiranjit Ahluwalia was subject to sexual, mental, emotional and physical abuse for a 
number of years, with her husband having her believe that she herself was to blame for her 
circumstances. He had knocked her unconscious, and her doctor’s notes refer to her having been 
beaten with a telephone. He had also attempted to run her over in his car at a family wedding, and 
threatened to burn her face with an iron.36 These matters were neither trivial nor insignificant. Yet 
they did not, in the first instance at least, receive the same amount of mitigation afforded to the 
above mentioned cases of male defendants and ‘nagging’ female victims. 
The final straw seemed to be reached in the case of Holley37, with the majority acknowledging that 
battered women would need to use diminished responsibility in order to have a chance at a partial 
defence, whether this was just or not.38 This overtook the progress made by the previous decision in 
the case of Morgan Smith39, which had allowed attributing characteristics of the defendant when 
deliberating the reasonable person test.  Capacity for self-control was returned to a rigid and 
uncompromising standard, without any scope for the flexibility the courts had been using to 
accommodate cases such as battered women. The only variables contributable to capacity for self-
control were, once again, age and gender.40 
With this dilemma now well-known, the solution eluded the courts. The characteristics of cases 
where battered women had killed their abuser simply did not fit appropriately within any partial 
defence. Reform of the law was the only solution, and evidently a considerable factor in abolishing 
provocation in favour of a new partial defence. 
III. Why Not Self-Defence? 
                                                          
34 Rossiter [1994] 2 All ER 752 
35 Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008 
36 Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 
37 Holley [2005] 2 AC 580 
38 Holley [2005] 2 AC 580, see G Virgo, ‘Provocation Restrained’ (2005) 64 Criminal Law Journal 532 
39 Smith (Morgan James) [2001] 1 AC 146 
40 GR Sullivan, AP Simester, JP Spencer and GJ Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 393 
The complete defence of self-defence is beyond the reach of the battered woman acting pre-
emptively without the setting of an ongoing attack. This is because the defence relies predominantly 
on three components – imminence, necessity and proportionality. All three of these elements are 
questionable in the case of the battered woman. Lack of an imminent threat from an abuser who is 
off-guard or sleeping makes it difficult to show both that there was an immediate threat and that 
the actions were necessary. Proportionality is equally problematic, with battered women often 
choosing to arm themselves rather than face their attacker with bare fists41. This often makes the 
violence a battered woman uses to defend herself seem ‘excessive’, when she is really resorting to a 
form of ‘violent self-help’.42 
It is unfortunate that self-defence has an all-or-nothing approach. The defence either succeeds, 
resulting in acquittal, or fails, resulting in a murder conviction. In a 1996 report,43 the Home Office 
stipulated that the benefits of introducing the half-way house partial defence of excessive force self-
defence are heavily outweighed by the complexities it would introduce. This was refuted by Lacey, 
who described excessive force self-defence ‘as compelling as the current defences on almost any 
conceivable conceptual, moral or practical basis’.44 Without this partial defence to fall back on if a 
self-defence plea fails because of disproportionate force, it makes it a very risky plea for battered 
women45. Some jurisdictions have been fortunate enough to have a defence of excessive force self-
defence, transforming the risky and troublesome self-defence plea into a much more attractive 
option which may render a defendant guilty of manslaughter if the violence used was merely 
disproportionate to the threat, as discussed later in this chapter. It is a shame that the defence 
cannot merely be based on necessity, rather than situations only of an immediate emergency. This 
urgency of action seems to be the factor which negates all defences, complete or partial, for 
battered women who kill their abusers. 
It has been argued that the courts really should be taking into consideration the difference in size 
and strength between the defendant and the victim and the affect this would have upon the 
                                                          
41 Sara Thornton, for example, retrieved a knife from the kitchen and returned to the living room with it 
42 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs, Julia Tolmie, “Defences to Homicide: Battered Women: A Comparative 
Analysis of laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand” (2012) 34 Syndey Law Review 467, 468 
43 Report of the Interdepartmental Review of the Law on the Use of Lethal Force in Self-Defence on the 
Prevention of Crime (Home Office, London, 1996) see also Andrew Ashworth,  and Barry Mitchell, 
‘Introduction’, Chapter 1, Barry Mitchell and Andrew Ashworth, Rethinking English Homicide Law,( Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 14 
44 Nicola Lacey, ‘Partial Defences to Homicide: Questions of Power and Principle in Imperfect and Less Perfect 
Worlds’, Chapter 5, B Mitchell and A Ashworth, Rethinking English Homicide Law,( Oxford University Press, 
2000) 113 
45 Nicola Wake, “Battered Women, Startled Householders and Psychological Self-Defence: Anglo-Australian 
Perspectives” (2013) 77 Journal of Criminal Law 433 
defendant’s apprehension of danger46, which would at least account for a woman who arms herself 
or attacks perhaps when the victim is slightly off-guard. Nevertheless, the imminence requirement 
will always be of importance to make sure this complete defence succeeds only in cases where the 
actions were absolutely necessary. In Canadian law, the Criminal Code 198547 in regards to self-
defence did not refer to imminence, with the Supreme Court instead stating that imminence was 
merely a proxy for assessing if the act was wholly necessary.48 This has since been updated,49 with 
new self-defence rules stating that person will not be guilty if they believed on reasonable grounds 
that there was a threat of force, they were defending themselves from that threat and the act was 
reasonable in the circumstances.50 To assess if it is reasonable, a list of factors are given, including 
the nature of the threat, if it was imminent or retreat was available, proportionality, physical abilities 
of both parties and the nature of any relationship between them.51 This advancement in the full 
defence takes a very significant leap forward for battered women who kill their abuser. 
IV. Battered Woman Syndrome and Walker’s Theory 
Lenore Walker was the first to coin the phrase ‘battered women’s syndrome’52, and explains it 
through the theory of ‘learned helplessness’. In short, the battered woman experiences a perpetual 
cycle involving three phases. This includes a build up to the violence where she continuously 
anticipates it, the violent period, and the aftermath in which the abuser appears sorry for his actions 
and may make false promises not to act that way again. It is seen by most as something akin to post 
traumatic stress disorder53:  
“The theory of learned helplessness explains how people lose the ability to predict whether 
their natural responses will protect them after they experience inescapable pain in what 
appear to be random and variable situations”54 
In Walker’s opinion, the effect of this cycle on the battered woman’s mind is that she feels she is in 
constant risk of danger; it is always imminent. As a result of this, she leaves in a state of constant 
dread, panic and apprehension. Many academics have sought to explain this state and how the 
woman herself has such knowledge of her abuser and his habits that she knows when violence is 
                                                          
46 Amir Pichhadze, “Proposals for Reforming the Law of Self-Defence” (2008) Journal of Criminal Law 409, 410 
47 Canada Criminal Code RSC 1985 c46 s34 
48 Lavelle (1990) 1 SCR 852, R v Petel (1994) 1 SCR 3 
49 Citizen’s Arrest and Self-Defence Act S.C. 2012 c9, replacing s34 Criminal Code 
50 Ibid s34(1) 
51 Ibid s34(2) 
52 See Lenore Walker, Terrifying Love – Why Battered Women Kill and How Society Responds (New York, 
HarperCollins, 1994). Walker has given evidence at several court appearances in the U.S in cases of battered 
women who have killed their abuser, relation to battered women’s syndrome 
53 Kirsta (n.23) 205 
54 Walker (n.52) 36. 
coming; even if there have been no threats. It is this feature of the battered women cases which 
provokes the most controversy. If a woman strikes when her abuser is sleeping, or at the table 
eating dinner, how can we say any threat was present? Yes, we may use the battered woman 
syndrome to say she always feels apprehensive because she knows violence is always just around 
the corner, but can that ever be an excuse for killing someone while they sleep? It will be left for the 
courts to determine whether the fear of serious violence qualifying trigger55 contained within the 
new partial defence will be met when the abuser could be seen in no way as being a threat at the 
present time. Evidently, there is no requirement under the new act that the defendant act suddenly 
after some incidence or threat of violence, however, a loss of self-control is still required, which 
signifies some impulsive action is still required. 
What is troublesome in dealing with the syndrome is that we have no real test for deciding which 
battered women do suffer from battered women’s syndrome, and which are using it in large part to 
meet the elements of the defence; a difficulty noted by Roberts56. It is possible that by using 
Walker’s theory we are merely grouping together all these women without much regard for 
individual circumstances, as long as domestic violence was the setting in which the defendant and 
victim lived. We must keep in mind that domestic violence alone does not suffice as satisfying the 
requirements for a partial defence to murder. 
Dressler discusses the immediacy point at some length, deeming these non-confrontational 
homicides as morally flawed57. He speculates that even in the light of Walker’s theories; the notion 
that a sleeping abuser presents an immediate threat to the life of a reasonable woman with battered 
woman syndrome is still unacceptable from a moral standpoint. He focuses on the premise that, no 
matter how you put it, what she did was not justified58. After all, the victim has rights too. Dressler 
does point out that duress and coercion, which might be phrases adequately used to sum up the 
situation of battered women who kill, result in the defendant having no fair opportunity to act in 
accordance with the law. Although her conduct is wrong, most would deem it rational, and he also 
speculates that coercion goes further than creating hard choices in that it actually incites some 
diminished rationality.59 Let us again consider the new partial defence of loss of control and its first 
                                                          
55 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s54(3) 
56 John W Roberts, “Between The Heat Of Passion and Cold Blood: Battered Woman’s Syndrome As An Excuse 
For Self-Defense In Non-Confrontational Homicides” (2003) 27 Law and Psychology Review 135 
57 Joshua Dressler, “Battered Women and Sleeping Abusers: Some Reflections” (2005) 3 Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 457 
58 Although she may be partially excused for it, see Dressler n(47) 463 
59 Joshua Dressler, “Why Keep The Provocation Defence: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject”  (2001-2002) 
86 Minnesota Law Review, 256 
limb, a fear of serious violence60. If a woman kills on the basis that he would one day kill her, 
obviously the courts aren’t going to say her actions are justifiable, but will we even be able to excuse 
them using this trigger? The more we delve into this problem, the more unlikely it seems. 
Evidently, not everyone agrees with Dressler’s view on non-confrontational homicide. Krause 
explains that, in her opinion, Dressler’s view of imminent danger is much too literal61. His contention 
is that battered women’s syndrome effectively explains why she viewed an attack as imminent even 
in the case of a sleeping abuser, and therefore juries need to hear this to better understand this 
more liberal analysis of imminence. Naturally, if a woman has frequently been subject to violence 
after her abuser has had a nap, she would not be deemed unreasonable to fear serious violence the 
second he awakes, which could be at any moment. She knows the threat he poses to her and she 
becomes familiar to when violence is most likely to occur. Basically, her survival is dependent upon 
her knowledge of her abuser62. Perhaps all we should be looking for is violence that is inevitable, and 
we should be open to her account of being in fear of immediate harm. She is an expert of her 
situation, and better equipped than anyone else to assess when danger is looming, in the same way 
that a cardiologist might better predict when a heart problem might occur than a general 
practitioner. The battered woman has an in-depth knowledge of her abuser that a woman without 
these experiences does not have. 
In consideration of the above the ultimate question is do we really need a “syndrome” to explain the 
actions of such women at all? Should we say her state of mind has been altered because of the 
eternal danger she feels she is in? Or should we say she is giving a normal and rational response to 
an abnormal and terrifying situation? The vital thing to remember is whichever of these reasons we 
use to excuse her actions, neither explains why she appears not to have lost her self-control, and 
that is the key feature of the new act. As Edwards notes63, women will still be required to lose self-
control “in the conventional way”, and ‘learned helplessness’ has never managed to explain why the 
battered woman is suddenly so empowered as to kill64. Tolmie asserts that the nature of battered 
woman syndrome evidence is unlikely to be successful in adapting the self-defence doctrine to 
                                                          
60 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s54(3) 
61 Joan H Krause, “Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A Response To Professor Dressler”  
(2006) 4 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 555 
62 See Edwards (n.2) 
63 Susan Edwards ‘Loss of Self-Control’: When His Anger is Worth More Than Her Fear’  Chapter 6, Reed and 
Bohlander, Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International 
Perspectives, (Ashgate, Surrey, 2011) 79. 
64 See Kenny (n14) p25 
accommodate the experiences of battered women, and it is safe to assume that the partial defences 
will suffer the same fate.65 
A. Diminished Responsibility 
Diminished responsibility was the partial defence ultimately utilised to have some of the most 
famous cases see a reduction in conviction from murder to manslaughter.66 It was also recognised in 
the judgment of Holley as the route to be taken by battered women who kill their abuser.67 This 
option does not sufficiently explain the circumstances of a battered woman, and again tries to deem 
the defendant an irrational being, rather than recognising that it is the situation which is abnormal, 
and she is merely responding to this egregious situation. Kirsta described diminished responsibility 
as a defence fundamentally designed to distinguish psychopaths from the insane.68 It is not a 
certainty that a battered woman is mentally abnormal simply because she has managed to continue 
surviving and even living a productive life in the face of the most insufferable odds. A defence of 
diminished responsibility would also likely negate any plea of self-defence being presented 
concurrently, because the constraints of self-defence demand some level of reasonableness. A 
defendant operating at a diminished capacity is not reasonable. This might also be the reason why 
many battered women themselves are reluctant to plead diminished responsibility, worrying of the 
repercussions such a formal acknowledgement of irrational actions might have on keeping custody 
of their children. The defence of diminished responsibility was narrowed by the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009, now requiring a recognised medical condition for a successful plea.69 If battered women 
who kill are unable to use the partial defence of loss of control due to that very concept, it is likely 
they will also find diminished responsibility unavailable unless they have had some kind of medical 
diagnosis to explain their actions. 
V. Time-Lapse, Considered Desire for Revenge, and Her Reluctance to Leave 
A question many jurors dealing with battered women cases will have asked is why she did not simply 
leave the abuser and distance herself from the situation. This question is asked as if this is as simple 
as the ability to retreat as a man in a bar fight might have. There are other courses of action which 
are available without any certain level of reprisal. The real question we should be asking is whether 
or not she in fact had fair opportunity to do so. Did she manage to successfully gain help from the 
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authorities, giving her the peace of mind that if he pursued her they would intervene? Was there a 
woman’s refuge in the area? Most importantly, if she had children, where could she take them and 
how would she support them?70Other factors could include harm to her loved ones, lack of money, 
the belief that the abuser will change, and ultimately, that she still loves him. There is also a 
significant fear of retribution if she is found, with battered women often being threatened with all 
kinds of violence, and death, should they try to leave or end the relationship.71 As Ewing has noted: 
“Violence against battered women often escalates any time they attempt to take any control 
over their lives or the battering relationship”.72 
The relationship may be devastating, but she may still love him73. Perhaps, rather than asking why 
she did not leave, what should be asked is why he did not let her go. This is a question which seems 
to be overlooked time and time again74. 
This feature to the cases of battered women who kill is not the only one which raises questions.  As 
discussed, one of the key characteristics of cases involving battered women killing their abuser is a 
lapse of time between the last violent incident and the fatal act. Under the old law75, this was most 
problematic because the retaliation was not sudden76, and any period of time between the 
provocative act and the fatal blow would give the defendant opportunity to calm down and resume 
rational thinking. It has even been suggested that such a time lapse gives the defendant an 
opportunity to take another course of action77. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 does not include a 
requirement that the actions be sudden, but it does still require that troublesome loss of self-control 
element, even for the fear of serious violence limb. One might ask if it is possible to lose self-control 
in any manner other than suddenly, as loss of control implies an element of unexpected impulse.78 
Therefore although the new partial defence expressly articulates that ‘suddenness’ is no longer a 
requirement, the retention of an emotion-based response which is inherently instantaneous implies 
that it is still present. 
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For this reason, it has been noted that the considered desire for revenge exclusion79might come into 
play for cases involving battered women, particularly in relation to the ‘sleeping abusers’ scenario80. 
She might be seen as seeking revenge for the way she has been treated, rather than acting in self-
preservation. If she arms herself, it might be viewed as evidence of premeditation, rather than 
seeking to defend her physical self adequately, knowing her fists are no match for his superior 
strength in retaliation. It may be that she has armed herself for a reason other than planning to kill – 
to scare him for example81. If her emotional state accounts for her picking up a knife, negating not 
only a desire for revenge but possibly mens rea, there is still a question of her intent at the time of 
plunging the knife in while he lies still and motionless sleeping. A valid point to consider is that, if she 
had in fact premeditated killing her abuser, it would be reasonable to assume she would attempt to 
cover her tracks, if she considers his previous violence will prevent her from a murder conviction. In 
many cases, the woman calls for an ambulance82, and gives herself up freely83. 
We might also contemplate the calm manner the battered woman often appears to portray. Not 
only does it contrast with the explosive loss of self-control we can all easily identify, but it can also 
make the act seem even more calculated. The possibility remains that, rather than expressing their 
anger, these women suppress it until they are so terrified of what will happen if they continue to do 
so, they realise the situation has reached an ultimatum: kill or be killed.84 As Kirsta notes, battered 
women may take a much longer time to become angry than their male counterparts, but “once 
enraged the fire may smoulder and burn longer”85. It might be days, or even weeks, since the last 
episode of serious violence, but such an incident may stay at the forefront of the battered woman’s 
mind for a lot longer than the next few moments after it occurred. This point is made by Kiranjit 
Ahluwalia in her autobiography: 
“I was settling into a pattern. Deepak would be violent, I would cry in response, then after 
four or five days I would cool down, but I would remain depressed”.86 
Not only does she state that it would take her ‘four of five days’ to cool down after a violent episode, 
but even after that time she would continue to suffer as a result. This means that at any point during 
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the next few days after the last triggering incident, her emotions were still under the influence of 
that incident, and she could have reacted to it. 
The problem battered woman most commonly encounter is that acting in the middle of a 
confrontation creates an enormous risk to her; but she instinctively knows that the longer she waits 
after sensing that there will be another attack soon, the more of a risk she takes that she will not be 
able to defend herself adequately when the time comes87. Assuming, after consideration of the 
theories surrounding battered woman’s syndrome, that she does have a heightened sense of 
perception when it comes to judging if an attack will be soon, she is sure to assess such risk in a 
more imperative manner, and this in turn will affect at what point she chooses to act.88 
VI. Cumulative Provocation and Loss of Self-Control 
One of the issues evident in the courts throughout the break-through cases of battered women89is 
that of cumulative provocation. It was even touched upon in the case of Duffy, with Devlin J referring 
to a “series of acts”90.Unfortunately for battered women, the most recent provocative incident is not 
always the most severe; often it is only the tip of the iceberg.91 Yet the traditional provocation 
defence did not allow us to dive under the surface and view it in its entirety.92 It had failed dismally 
to consider the cumulative effects of several violent and emotionally abusive episodes over a period 
of time. These cases demonstrated that it was possible for a series of incidents to build up, 
eventually resulting in the defendant taking action; and the courts noted not only this but also that 
loss of self-control could be slow-burning rather than immediate93. Rather than loss of self-control, 
the actuality of the circumstances of a battered woman killing her abuser might be more adequately 
described as a wearing down of self-restraint until none remains, the last shred being diminished by 
the most recent provocative incident, however trivial it may seem in comparison to other abusive 
episodes.94 
It appears that the cumulative provocation issue is one that has been resolved by the new partial 
defence. Instead of considering characteristics, we will now look to the “circumstances of D” when 
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considering the defendant’s actions95 against the gravity of the situation. Surely, any history of 
domestic violence will be considered as the defendant’s circumstances, as ‘circumstances’ indicates 
external factors as opposed to the word ‘characteristics’, which signifies internal traits. This is a 
victory for battered women who kill their abuser. Statements given by the defendant often show a 
whole regime of fear, with the defendant’s behaviour carefully planned in an attempt to avoid 
violence. For example, in the Australian High Court case of Osland,96 the defendant and her son 
would stand at the window every day watching for the victim to come home. His behaviour and 
demeanour as he got out of the car would indicate to them what kind of mood he was in, and what 
kind of night they would have. A routine like this is now relevant in trying to establish how someone 
in the defendant’s position might have acted, and the last provocative actions of the victim can now 
be viewed within the context of the other ways in which the deceased had seriously wronged the 
defendant and treated them over time. 
The real problem that remains for battered women is the concept of loss of self-control. The 
updated law in England and Wales has seen the inclusion of this element despite the Law 
Commission’s recommendations to omit it from any reformed version of the provocation defence97. 
It appears this anger-related behaviour is here to stay. It must be seriously questioned whether or 
not this is necessary. As Wells has observed: 
“An excuse based on loss of self-control seems to imply an underlying aggression in all of us 
which is capable of release under certain circumstances”.98 
It is fair to say that most people are capable of an angry outburst in the face of extreme provocation, 
although not necessarily a violent retaliatory action, and it is fairly straightforward to see its 
attachment to the second limb of the defence. It would not be considered unusual for someone, in 
circumstances of extremely grave character with the feeling of being seriously wronged, to act 
impulsively and rashly in a manner related to losing self-control.99 It would, however, be erroneous 
to say this is the course of events for someone who fears they are about to be subject to serious 
violence.100 They may act instinctively, but this concept is somewhat different101. As Norrie 
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speculates, the fear of serious violence trigger may be nothing but a tool to encompass cases not 
covered by self-defence102, and self-defence does not demand any kind of loss of control. 
It is likely the courts will now need to establish some behavioural markers associated with fear and 
desperation which can be deemed evidence of her inward loss of control over the situation. It is a 
much needed course of action if the loss of control concept is to remain. Horder described a woman 
being left in a state of emotional disturbance which makes her take “retaliatory action” when the 
provoker is “off his guard”103, but how exactly the courts will define fear and terror is yet to be seen. 
The most effective way would most certainly be to look at previous cases and try to identify some 
common actions by women acting out of fear. The most common seems their choice, subconscious 
as it may be, to tackle their abusers while unprepared rather than during one of many altercations. 
While attacking the sleeping abuser is problematic in itself (as discussed previously), it may simply 
show the almost universal thought process of the battered woman – she is so affected by terror that 
she does not dare to approach him at any other time. Another suggested means of discovering 
evidence of loss of self-control is the defendant’s lack of concern for their own welfare. Why would 
they commit an act knowing they could spend a considerable amount of time in prison if they were 
thinking rationally? If the woman had put gloves on before picking up a weapon in order to prevent 
having her finger prints on it, this person is acting rationally to avoid detection. This differs to a 
person who takes action to ensure they succeed in killing the victim by loading a gun104. Herring 
offers an excellent explanation of loss of self-control caused by an emotion other than anger: 
“We are not looking for a defendant driven ‘crazy’ by anger, but a defendant battling 
conflicting emotions and where control is lost over which emotion is to determine her 
actions”105. 
The courts will need to give the concept a very liberal meaning in order to honour such a 
rationalisation of the very foundation the new defence is built upon. An additional important aspect 
to cases of battered women who kill their abuser is that they don’t attempt to lie about the situation 
by pretending he was about to attack her, or that he had just threatened to do so. Such actions 
would suggest some level of premeditation. 
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VII. Other Jurisdictions and Their Treatment of Abused Women Who Kill 
Clearly we are not the only jurisdiction to experience a problem in trying to deal with battered 
women who kill their abusers. What is apparent is the way in which we have dealt with it; it seems 
to differ, in some cases quite vastly, to other jurisdictions. It is certain that law reform in the areas of 
partial defences to murder and self-defence in many jurisdictions has had a very distinct focus on 
accommodating battered women who kill.106 
A. The United States of America 
It is extremely difficult to talk of ‘America’s’ position on this issue, as each individual state is a 
jurisdiction in itself. It would also be just as difficult to examine each state individually so as to 
establish what kind of defences are available to battered women who kill their abuser, complete or 
otherwise. Each state has some kind of determinate sentencing, and this is an important factor in 
what defences are available, having little scope for mitigating factors at the sentencing stage107.  
It might be more appropriate to look at the most relevant and prevailing schools of thought in the 
area; one of which is the Model Penal Code’s partial defence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance108. The Model Penal Code has been described as the ‘greatest single influence’109on 
many state codes: 
“The success of the Model Penal Code has been stunning. Largely under its influence, well 
over half the states have adopted revised penal codes, creating a veritable renaissance of 
criminal law reform unparalleled in history”110 
For this reason, we might look at this Code as the closest thing there is to an American criminal code, 
even though it is neither the first nor the most ambitious attempt to codify the law111. As Robinson 
has pointed out, the Model Penal Code has served as a platform for updating existing criminal law, 
“in almost three-quarters of the states”112. The other notable concept which has led to much 
academic debate is stretching the complete defence of self-defence to accommodate battered 
women who kill, especially in cases of ‘sleeping abusers’. 
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B. The Preoccupation with Extending Self-Defence 
 In the United States, the majority of states seem to be dealing with such cases in the same manner – 
stretching self-defence to accommodate the circumstances, even to the extent of acquitting in cases 
of non-confrontational homicides113. In some states there are even specific guidelines for jury 
instructions in a case where a battered woman claims she acted in self-defence114. Not only this, but 
several woman have in fact been granted clemency after being convicted of killing their abuser115. In 
one particular case in Manitoba, a woman was acquitted of murdering her abusive partner on 
grounds of self-defence after almost accepting a twelve year sentence pleading guilty to 
manslaughter.116 Perhaps this is the right path. We might take the view that the imminent danger 
element to self-defence is merely a safeguard in ensuring killing was necessary, and because these 
women knew their abusers’ likelihood of causing them serious bodily harm in the near future, it was 
prevalent. Nourse describes imminence as the ‘quintessential definition of objectivity’117.  
Consider the moral message this sends, and whether or not we should justify a woman killing a 
sleeping abuser, rather than agreeing her actions were wrong but excusing them. It must be 
remembered that there was some element of choice, at least in the literal sense; therefore some 
level of culpability is warranted118. Without getting too deep into the debate over the moral standing 
for different defences; that is, if they are justificatory or excusatory in nature, it is imperative to keep 
in mind that self-defence is considered a justificatory defence. We are justifying the actions because 
they were seen as sensible, good or permissible. Actions which would have been wrong in other 
circumstances are deemed tolerable. It would be a very far stretch to say this is true of the battered 
woman who kills her sleeping abuser. Particularly in English law, we much more see this as 
behaviour as partially ‘excused’, which is why an acquittal would be unacceptable, even if any tough 
punishment is not warranted. This is because the defendant acts retrospectively in some sense, to 
events already occurred, which touches on a form of retribution. Even a battered woman who kills 
her sleeping abuser in a pre-emptive strike to stop further violence is not acting purely 
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prospectively119. A remarkably interesting point made by Dressler120 is the often overlooked issue of 
why we are excusing – is it because of the victim’s actions causing their own demise, or due to 
compassion for her passionate outburst? 
The true question to ask rather than if violence was imminent was whether violence could have 
been avoided completely, remembering that the obligation is not for her to leave the relationship, 
but for him to cease his violent outbursts. Taking this view, violence is inevitable. It would be a 
definite step forward to view imminence subjectively as to how a battered woman’s perception 
perceives imminence .It is apparent that courts seeking to extend self-defence in such circumstances 
are making such allowances.121 The battered woman feels she lives in a continuing state of 
confrontation.122 
This differs significantly to our approach, trying to squeeze these cases into the boundaries of an 
anger-fuelled partial defence which will still result in a manslaughter conviction. It would seem we 
are intent on still assigning these women some fraction of culpability which the American courts feel 
is unnecessary.123 Our courts are plainly unwilling to bend the rules of a complete defence. Non-
confrontational homicides are at the core of this debate because of their outwardly pacifist nature; 
where the fatal blow is dealt in a situation where the risk of harm appears minimal.124 
Confrontational homicides involving battered women striking their abusers is much more akin to 
self-defence, depending on the severity of the circumstances.  
C. EMED 
Despite this approach being adopted in some cases, there is also a partial defence which will reduce 
murder to manslaughter.  Contained in the Model Penal Code125, it is applicable if a person commits 
homicide whilst under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a 
reasonable explanation. Whether or not there is reasonable explanation is then determined from 
the viewpoint of the defendant’s situation. Eleven states have adopted the Code with this partial 
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defence specifically126, while a further twenty-three adopted the Code without extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, but retaining variations of the common law provocation defence127. 
At first glance this defence seems very appealing for battered women. Overwhelmed by emotions of 
fear and desperation to the point of overriding reason, she commits the fatal act. No final 
provocative act is necessary; no loss of self-control or behaviour associated with anger is needed. 
Not only this, but the objective string to this defence’s bow appears to allow reasonableness to be 
judged from the viewpoint of a battered woman. This move away from a ‘reasonable man’ standard 
means more attention is paid to the actor’s situation. In fact, it almost makes it seem as though it is 
the situation, rather than the actor, that is the true culprit.128  
In reality, and unlikely as it may seem in an academic sense, the defence has actually been widely 
used by men in situations of jealousy and possessiveness129.  The defence is, therefore, described by 
Drogin and Marin as “broad”, although having in reality a fairly narrow purpose130. It has even been 
suggested that this partial defence might be appropriate for battered women to use in cases where 
there is an anger element; for example sexual infidelity has played a part and this provokes the 
woman into finally taking action131. 
One example of a state which has adopted this defence is Hawaii132. Their traditional common law 
doctrine of heat of passion was much akin to our provocation defence, with both an objective and 
subjective component. With EMED in this state, there are three real elements to the defence; there 
are circumstances the defendant is exposed to; that reasonably upsets their emotional state; and 
this causes a loss of self-control. This loss of self-control element is most interesting. It is not 
contained in the wording of the Model Penal Code or Hawaii’s Revised Statutes; however it has been 
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established through the courts that the element exists133, leading some to describe loss of self-
control as being an “indispensable element” to the defence134. It is fascinating that this element has 
become a requirement in this state. It makes Hawaii’s defence virtually an amalgam of the Model 
Penal Code’s EMED and our loss of self-control defence. One might ask if self-control is really 
necessary when the defence is wholly based upon someone acting in a frenzied emotional state: the 
same question we should be asking of our own new partial defence. 
EMED is not without criticism. Kadish,135 whilst commending the wide scope for assessing the 
“reasonable explanation” aspect (which is not dissimilar from our own flexible approach to the 
provocation defence under the Morgan Smith136 precedent), is less enthusiastic in regards to the 
wide scope given in assessing the “actor’s situation”. Nourse137is also critical. Whilst noting that the 
defence has somewhat rejected the reasonable man concept in favour of a much more liberal 
defence which focuses on the actor’s unique situation, there is still a remaining question of which 
emotional responses merit the protection of the law: 
“Ultimately, the code offers an institutional solution: It tells us that the jury should decide 
whether the situation merits compassion”138 
As purposeful as this might sound, it remains that there is no instruction in the defence itself on 
which emotion-fuelled incidents should be left to the jury in the first place, albeit it is obvious it will 
not be limited to anger-related violence. 
Several states adopted some form of the EMED defence, but the outcome of this varied considerably 
from state to state. At the other end of the spectrum to the approach taken by Hawaii, Kentucky had 
abandoned their common law provocation defence (much similar to ours) for one of extreme 
emotional disturbance139. Yet after several attempts by the courts to define its parameters, the 
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defence ended up unnecessarily similar to that of insanity, merely without the requirement of a 
psychiatric disorder140. It was defined, in the case of McClellan v Commonwealth, as follows: 
“A temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed or disturbed as to overcome one’s 
judgement, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the appealing force of the extreme 
emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes”141 
Perhaps it is the word ‘uncontrollable’ that does not belong here, and makes this defence more akin 
to insanity than provocation. Regardless, it is a very restricted view of the type of situation which 
would make for a successful plea, and the word ‘enraged’ suggests the only acceptable emotion 
involved would be anger. Battered women in this state might have been more easily accommodated 
under the old common law. 
The partial defence of EMED best reflects the circumstances of battered women who kill; 
recognising a level of culpability and choice, albeit a very difficult choice as Dressler noted,142 whilst 
allowing a lenient sentence if necessary. Stretching self-defence to include these cases, particularly 
in non-confrontational situations, creates an inaccurate representation of the defence itself and 
justification in a case where excuse is much more fitting. 
D. Australia 
Australia’s approach is slightly different again, with a much more relaxed take on the traditional 
provocation doctrine.143 There are eight territories all with their own jurisdiction and statutory or 
common law crimes and defences. Yet the way each has dealt with the issue of battered women 
killing their abusers has made it the “trend-setter” on the law in this area144. Most states have 
reformed to eliminate the imminence requirement of self-defence145. Both Tasmania and Victoria 
abolished the provocation defence146, although in varying ways. Whilst Tasmania’s approach was to 
rely mostly on sentencing discretion, Victoria enacted a new crime of defensive homicide with no 
minimum sentence147. It is important to bear in mind that these states had this luxury afforded to 
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them through the process of abolishing the mandatory minimum sentence for murder148. Attractive 
as this seems, it is important to bear in mind that this scenario cuts juries out of the equation. It 
would be difficult to call this a step in the right direction. 
The movement to amend self-defence law rules rather than seeking a modified partial defence to 
accommodate them seems somewhat idealistic, and does not address the pre-emptive and 
sometimes premeditated actions taken. Western Australia has extended self-defence so that the 
defendant can act to protect themselves or another against a harmful act which is not imminent, as 
long as they have a belief based on reasonable grounds that it is necessary.149 If it is unreasonable 
then excessive force self-defence might apply. As suggested earlier, the problem with self-defence is 
its speculative nature – we can never say with certainty if the force used was in fact necessary to 
thwart an attack, as there is always the possibility of an intervening act150. It might not be likely that 
something will happen to prevent the attack from happening, but if it is conceivable then it must be 
questionable whether or not the retaliatory attack was necessary. This is an extremely important 
question is cases of non-confrontational actions. What we are in fact asking is if we should give the 
aggressor the benefit of the doubt that he would have changed his ways. In the famous Susan Falls 
case,151 Applegarth J said that in a case of a battered woman, there would continue to be violence, 
so the risk is ever present.152 In the Northern Territory case of Secretary v The Queen153, it was 
decided by Mildred J that as long as the person making a threat has the ability to carry it out, there is 
no need for fear 154of immediate violence. It is an ability to effect a purpose, having knowledge of 
the facts. This seems to suggest that there need only be a relationship with a dangerous nature 
where a serious attack could and would happen in the near future.155 
E. The Queensland Approach 
Queensland’s take on the situation has been extremely distinctive, and they have dealt with the 
dilemmatic choices presented in a bespoke manner to their territorial counterparts. They have 
created a partial defence specifically to deal with the battered women issue. It was borne out of 
realisation that self-defence is very difficult to apply to non-confrontational homicide cases of 
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battered women killing their abuser.156 Since Queensland, much like English law, have a mandatory 
life sentence, an accessible route to mitigation was required.157 As opposed to trying to extend self-
defence recently, a level of culpability is retained: 
304B Killing for preservation in an abusive domestic relationship 
(1) A person who unlawfully kills another (the deceased) under circumstances that, but for the 
provisions of this section, would constitute murder, is guilty of manslaughter only, if –  
(a) The deceased has committed acts of serious domestic violence against the person in the 
course of an abusive domestic relationship; and 
(b) The person believes that it is necessary for the person’s preservation from death or 
grievous bodily harm to do the act or make the omission that causes death; and 
(c) The person has reasonable grounds for the belief having regard to the abusive domestic 
relationship and all the circumstances of the case158 
The explanatory notes accompanying this addition to homicide law asserted that the partial defence 
is to apply to killings which are committed out of both fear and desperation, when the defendant 
genuinely believes there is no other course of action to escape the impending danger.159 The unique 
element to this defence is that the focus is on what is reasonable to that defendant based upon the 
whole history of the abusive relationship, and it is to be applauded. The law must explore a battered 
woman’s reality in order to accurately assess her culpability.160 
This new route to manslaughter for battered women who kill their abuser came into force just a few 
months before English law’s partial defence of loss of control. It is not restricted to battered women, 
but will equally cover family, informal care and intimate relationships, including same-sex.161 
Comparing this template to the provisions of the new English partial defence of loss of control 
contained in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 proves instructive: it is evident that Queensland’s 
perspective is far more enlightened, and we should learn from comparative precepts. It is tailored 
closely to the predicament of battered women, without need for what a reasonable person might do 
or even a reasonable battered woman might do. Yes, she must have reasonable grounds for 
believing that causing the abuser’s death was necessary in order to avoid death or serious injury 
herself, but this is having regard only to her relationship’s background and the specific details of this 
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case.162 This defence does not concern itself with what a battered woman might have done in this 
situation. It is concerned with the defendant, her unique knowledge of her partnership, and how this 
explains her perception of danger. Also note there is no loss of self-control needed; no frenzied 
attack, and no spontaneous eruption. The fundamental requirement is merely a woman acting in 
self-preservation. 163 
Queensland’s solution to the problem does not go as far as the United States strive to, as the charge 
is reduced only for murder to manslaughter rather than an acquittal; the grounds for this being  that 
the act was wrongful and not justified, but excused in part. This is due to the lack of triggering 
assault, and many states in the U.S. would do well to take note. We must remember that the 
sleeping abuser still has rights; but he violates her rights every day, and this may well be why no 
triggering assault or immediate danger is deemed necessary.164 With other territories also accepting 
self-defence pleas and acquitting women in this position,165 the decision to retain a partial defence 
aimed at such cases has not been universally popular. Some academics have claimed that if there 
has been a history of extreme abuse, even a non-confrontational homicide should be justified based 
on her ‘reasonably-grounded belief’ that she had no other option.166 It has also been pointed out 
that this has led to Queensland’s self-defence doctrine being left unaltered, with the imminence 
requirement still intact,167 but was reform necessary? In non-confrontational circumstances, the 
woman can use the new defence to seek a manslaughter conviction, acknowledging that some level 
of culpability is necessary. If there was confrontation, the traditional self-defence rules would 
suffice. 
What if there was some kind of triggering assault? It is possible that both self-defence and this 
partial defence could be raised. If this happens, are the jury likely to acquit rather than convict her of 
manslaughter?168 In 2010, the first case to see this partial defence in action has all but quashed that 
notion. Susan Falls169 bought a gun, and two weeks later she drugged her husband and shot him in 
the head. She had been subjected to physical and emotional abuse throughout her relationship, and 
her husband would frequently make threats towards her family and their children. He had killed nine 
                                                          
162 See Anthony Hopkins and Patricia Easteal, “Walking in Her Shoes: Battered Women Who Kill in Victoria, 
Western Australia and Queensland” (2010) 35 Alternative Law Journal 132 
163 Ewing n(60) 79; Celia Wells, “Battered Woman Syndrome and Defences To Homicide: Where Now?” (1994) 
14 Legal Studies 266, 273 
164 The abused woman is not only subject to violence but also made to suffer in other ways, such as degrading 
treatment. Judy Norman was forced to eat dog food from a bowl on the floor, State v Norman 324 N.C. 253, 
378 S.E. 2d 8, 1989 
165 For example, the New Zealand case Wang (1990) 2 NZLR 529 
166 Hopkins and Easteal (n.162) 
167 Hopkins and Easteal (n.162) p135 
168 See Edgely and Machetti (n.161)  
169 Susan Falls and others (supreme court of Queensland, Applegarth J, 26th May 2010) 
pet dogs throughout their relationship. The defendant had tried to seek assistance from the police 
on more than one occasion, but found them to be unhelpful. On the day of the fatal act, the 
deceased had told the defendant that he would kill one of their children if her mother came to visit. 
She was due to arrive a few days later, and the defendant had not been able to deter her from 
visiting. The deceased told the defendant he would kill their infant son and make it look like cot 
death, and she truly believed him. The jury were instructed on both self-defence and the new partial 
defence, with Applegarth J advising them to take into account the history of the relationship. After 
hearing the evidence of domestic abuse, the jury were sympathetic to her circumstances. The 
defendant was acquitted on grounds of self-defence, rather than being convicting of manslaughter 
by reason of preservation in an abusive relationship, even though a considerable amount of 
premeditation was present. 
This case certainly seems to negate any suggestion that Queensland’s abusive relationship defence 
will deny battered women an acquittal,170 but it continues to be a concern to some. Enactment of 
the partial defence does not give consideration to how lenient a jury may be after the facts of the 
case have been communicated,171 and it has been referred to as the “second best solution”.172 The 
sole fact that Susan Falls was acquitted despite the strict self-defence rules in Queensland (hence 
the need for the partial defence) should bring comfort to such concerns. 
F. The Demise of Excessive Force Self-Defence 
As stated earlier, excessive force in self-defence was, for a time at least, accepted in Australian 
common law. The partial defence was first recognised in the case of Howe173, where Mayo J held 
that if a defendant is found to have used more force than reasonably necessary in self-defence, the 
defendant will be guilty of manslaughter174. However, this doctrine was changed by a Privy Council 
decision in the Jamaican case of Palmer175, with the courts refusing to recognise the partial defence 
and stating that the complete defence of self-defence would either succeed or fail176. This would not 
prove to be the end for excessive force self-defence, as it was yet again recognised when the High 
Court held that not only that Privy Council decisions would no longer be binding, but that Howe was 
good law177. This would mean that juries would be instructed on excessive force self-defence as an 
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option in self-defence cases. This position seemed like a solution which should be embraced, with 
the partial defence filling a gap that the provocation defence had never managed to cover. It was, 
therefore, astonishing that the partial defence would yet again be retired from common law, 
rejected by the High Court in the case of Zecevic178. The reasoning given for this unexpected decision 
was that the partial defence not only lacked the support of solid precedents, but was also difficult 
for juries to comprehend179. Yeo speculates180 that the problem was merely how the partial defence 
was being presented to juries, pointing out that the Irish Supreme Court had accepted excessive 
force self-defence since approving the Howe decision without any comprehension problems for 
juries181. 
G. New Zealand 
New Zealand have abolished their provocation defence altogether,182 leaving it to a mitigating 
factor at the sentencing stage, in similar vein to the Australian territory of Tasmania.183 
Without a mandatory life sentence for murder, abolished in New Zealand in 2002,184 this may 
seem like an attractive option. It has merely relegated the issues associated with the defence 
of provocation to the sentencing hearing. This option for reform does not promote fair 
labelling of the crime which suits the diminished culpability of the defendant. The New Zealand 
Law Commission had concluded that the benefits of abolishing provocation outweighed any 
negative connotations,185 but this solution to the provocation dilemma is superficial. The 
mitigating factors in the case still need to be discussed, and the appropriate place for doing so 
is in front of the trial judge and jury. 
The Law Commission’s argument was that battered women would be better served by self-
defence, with provocation not benefiting such situations enough to warrant its retention.186 
Having studied cases in Auckland and Wekkington from 2001 to 2005, they found only one 
case where a battered woman had successfully used the provocation defence, affording them 
the opportunity to call such scenarios ‘rare’. Another study conducted over a ten year period 
from 2000 to 2010 showed ten cases of battered women who had killed their abuser, with 
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three cases where provocation was successful and a further two where provocation may have 
been the basis of a guilty manslaughter plea.187 
There has recently been much debate in New Zealand over reintroducing a partial defence to 
fill the gap left by provocation, or amending the self-defence plea to encompass cases of family 
violence. The controversial nature of the provocation plea reached the attention of the media 
after the case of Clayton Weatherston188 attempted to raise the partial defence after 
murdering his girlfriend, with it seeming as though the victim was the person on trial. On closer 
inspection, it might have been the way the courts have applied the law rather than inept legal 
rules which should have received such negative press. The kneejerk reaction to abolish the 
partial defence altogether without replacing it has eventually been realised, with the New 
Zealand Law Commission eventually releasing an Issues Paper,189 leading to a report in May 
2016.190 
This New Zealand Law Commission widely recognises the issues faced not only by battered 
women who kill, but also other kinds of family violence. They refer to family violence as being a 
‘gendered phenomenom’ in need of attention.191 The commission articulate that the types of 
homicide within their terms of reference account for only two per cent of homicides in New 
Zealand,192 but this does not mean there is not an obvious gap left by the lack of partial 
defences in New Zealand.193 This hole cannot be filled by mere sentencing mitigations, with the 
murder conviction stigmatism remaining,194 so there is a significant need for reduced 
culpability. The Commission have also noted that such mitigations are not always functional: 
“Sentencing outcomes have been harsher than was intended for victims of family violence who 
kill their abuser”.195 
The New Zealand Law Commission had reflected on recent changes on England and Wales, 
Queensland, Canada and Ireland, but their conclusion is that reform overseas ‘discloses no 
best practice’, merely demonstrating that there are a number of avenues to investigate.196 One 
thing they do note is that while provocation is ‘notorious’, most jurisdictions have subscribed 
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to it at some point.197 Their overall conclusion is that reform should take the shape of either a 
new partial defence, such as excessive force self-defence, loss of control, diminished 
responsibility or self-preservation, which would once again allow the jury to take part in 
assessing the level of culpability,198 or the creation of a new homicide offence.199 The 
Commission do note that no solution would be likely to cover all scenarios of intimate 
homicides.200 
H. Canada 
Although Canadian law has very traditional provocation defence and self-defence 
requirements, the way in which the law has been applied is much more progressive.201 The 
provocation partial defence reduces murder to manslaughter if committed in the heat of 
passion due to sudden provocation, which would deprive the ordinary person of self-control.202 
However, Canada’s concept since the early 1990s has been to consider battered woman 
syndrome a mental state which a normal woman might possess, not only in regards to 
provocation claims, but also for self-defence.203 This is to be preferred over the English 
approach in the early 1990s, which often deemed such women as ‘inherently abnormal and 
impaired’.204 In Lavallee, the courts held that it was not the presence of battered woman 
syndrome which provided a defence for the defendant, rather that it was a tool for the jury to 
assess the context of the violence.205 Although provocation has proved problematic for 
battered women who kill in Canada at times,206 and the self-defence statute itself is limiting,207 
the application of self-defence has been relaxed in recent years. Canadian law is not without 
problems in this area, but the modern approach to the traditional doctrines is refreshing. 
 
Canadian law allows for discretionary sentencing for a manslaughter conviction,208 but the 
mandatory sentence for murder remains rigid, at twenty-five years before parole for first 
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degree murder, and ten for second degree.209 This makes the inclusion of a partial defence vital 
to accessing justice in this area, with such extreme differences in the sentencing regimes for 
murder and manslaughter. Currently, there seems to be a disparity from sentencing judges 
between the punishment for men who kill in a jealous rage and battered women who kill. In a 
recent case study, it was determined that men pleading provocation typically receive a 
sentence of six to twelve years, whilst women are likely to get a maximum of two years down 
to a suspended sentence.210 This really shows the judicial system to be making decisions based 
on the merits of the case, ensuring the punishment fits the crime, after a string of cases 
causing a negative public reaction when provocation was successfully raised in cases of male 
jealousy.211 
VIII. Ahluwalia v Thornton – Fear of Violence v Justifiable Sense of Being Wronged 
There are two limbs of the English partial defence of loss of control which a battered woman might 
rely on, having killed her abuser. Which option should she choose? We often group similar cases 
together into a particular category of homicides, such as ‘battered women who kill’, but the disparity 
between such cases can be vast. The case might be a confrontational homicide, during an episode in 
which the deceased is violent towards the defendant, but not serious life-threatening violence which 
might provide a successful plea of self-defence. It could be a non-confrontational homicide, 
committed when the defendant is sleeping or eating at the dinner table. The history of the 
relationship might include physical, sexual, mental or emotional violence, or a combination of these. 
It could involve threats of violence or actual violence to a third party, such as the defendant’s 
children, brothers, sisters or parents. For this reason, presuming that only the first qualifying trigger 
applies to such vast a category of cases as battered women who kill their abuser is a mistake. 
Casting aside the loss of control element, which is problematic for battered women in most 
situations, the circumstances might fit adequately into the fear of serious violence limb in the 
majority of cases, but in others a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged might be more 
appropriate. The fear of serious violence concept seems to have been developed for cases such as 
battered women killing their abuser, but it is not necessarily the only qualifying trigger for which 
they meet the criteria. This might seem as if the battered women now have more choices than ever 
before of avenues they can pursue to defend their actions against a charge of murder. Still, no 
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matter which qualifying trigger they put forward, they must have caused a loss of self-control, which 
is instantly problematic, as discussed earlier.212  
As stated, it is not necessary; nor is it accurate, to group all battered women together.213 Most cases 
have their similarities, but they have their differences too. At first glance, it would appear the fear of 
serious violence qualifying trigger has been created for battered women who kill, but do not meet 
the criteria for self-defence, while the ‘seriously wronged’ trigger is aimed at situations fuelled by 
anger214. Then again, it would be very unfair to say that battered women are not allowed to act out 
of anger, and even further from the truth to declare that they do not have a justifiable sense of 
being wronged after years of abuse and suffering. If this history of abuse is indeed grave enough in 
character, surely this will go a long way towards satisfying the objective test215.  
Looking back at previous cases, it might be possible to adduce which of the two qualifying triggers 
they would have been most likely to plead successfully, if we were to remove the loss of control 
element.216 In the case of Ahluwalia217, her husband beat her brutally and advised her that he would 
do so again later. When he went to the bedroom to sleep, she was desperate to think of a way to 
prevent that from happening, because she simply could not take any more. She took some petrol 
upstairs and poured it over his feet, then set it alight. She claimed her intention was not to kill him, 
merely to prevent him running after her: 
“I’ll do something to his feet when he is asleep so that he gets a scar for life, so that he can’t 
run after me.”218 
 This is a case of a woman fearing for her safety acting in self-preservation, and rather than her plan 
being to kill him, it was merely to fight back in a way which would end his reign of terror and allow 
her to live without constant fear of his attacks. Sara Thornton’s biography tells a much different tale 
.219 She suffered similar beatings, and also constantly feared her partner’s violent outbursts, but her 
reaction was much more of righteous indignation. Her breaking point came when she couldn’t be a 
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victim any longer, and she realised that she was the only one who could save herself from this 
dreadful situation of violence and abuse. Her case would have been much more likely to succeed as 
circumstances of an extremely grave character leading her to feel she had been seriously wronged, 
and justifiably so.220  It might not seem like an important point to make – as long as the battered 
woman can meet the requirements of one of the qualifying triggers she has a partial defence. What 
this does show is that the partial defences are not actually gendered as one might think at first 
glance, with the first limb being aimed towards women and the latter towards men.221 Much as a 
man might act out of fear, a woman may act out of anger. 
Bearing in mind that battered women often snap at what seems like trivial provocation, rather than 
a time when the abuse is at its very worst, this could suggest that these women act when they are 
angry and frustrated with the dire situation they are in, rather than when they are at their most 
scared and vulnerable.222 They live in constant fear from violence, but it is not necessarily what fuels 
the fatal act, and shouldn’t be presumed as such. Wells stated that the old provocation defence 
conveyed a mixed message. She questioned whether the basis for the defence was a concession to 
human frailty, or culpability was reduced due to wrongdoing by the victim.223 Perhaps the qualifying 
triggers are founded upon both of these concepts, with the first qualifying trigger being established 
on the idea that the victim has acted in a cruel or violent manner and so contributed to his or her 
own demise, while the second qualifying trigger is the concession to human frailty, with no fair 
opportunity to act in the way society would expect due to being confronted with the most grave of 
situations.224 
IX. Opening the Floodgates 
Recently, new legislation expanded the remit of self-defence to provide access for startled 
householders using disproportionate force, as long as it is not grossly disproportionate.225 This 
sudden jump to include only startled householders in the full defence is peculiar, and already 
causing debate including when prosecution in such cases is necessary.226 There is no legal 
                                                          
220 It is her emotions and not her actions that were justified. 
221 Horder (n.103) p136 
222 Wells asserted that battered women often snap over something trivial rather than at the worst of the 
abuse, which could signify that they are acting when they are angry at the situation rather than scared, see 
Wells (n.1) 89 
223 Ibid., 105 
224 See generally, Stephen P Garvey, “Passion’s Puzzle” (2005) 90 Iowa Law Review 1677 
225 Crimes and Courts Act 2013 s43, amending Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 s76 
226 R (on the application of Collins) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] 2 WLR 1303, The Cps decided not to 
prosecute a householder who caused serious injury to a trespasser by holding him in a headlock until the 
police arrived, believing a jury would likely have held the defendant to have a genuine belief such actions were 
necessary. 
justification as to why such cases should be put on a pedestal above other categories of cases as 
warranting justification for their actions. It is easy to speculate on the reason why this extension of 
self-defence was not also made available to battered women who kill their abusers. It would be seen 
as giving women a licence to kill in any kind of abusive relationship, and such a provision might also 
be claimed to represent the lessening of the criminal law as a deterrent.227 In cases of battered 
women who kill, the defendant will often have called the ambulance or the police, admitted to the 
homicide freely, shown great remorse for their actions and be grieving the loss of their partner228. 
Having any kind of custodial sentence deterrent from a guaranteed conviction would be unlikely to 
have any effect upon their actions, since their actions are barely reflected on at the time.229 It is also 
improbable that the threat of prison would have any such effect because their liberty is already 
severely compromised in the violent relationship: 
 “The net result for the battered woman is a life hardly worth living”.230 
The reality is that the woman is acting to protect not only her physical self, but her psychological 
self, almost from instinct. If a battered woman acts to preserve her psychological self in the same 
way that a startled householder acts to protect themselves and their property, why are they not 
treated in the same manner when it comes to defences to murder? 
A. Psychological Self-Defence 
The creation of a new defence of psychological self-defence is an intriguing idea. It has been 
suggested as both a partial defence231 and as a full justificatory defence232. Earlier in this article it 
was made clear that in the United States, cases of battered women who kill their abuser are often 
acquitted on the grounds of self-defence, even in non-confrontational circumstances. Ewing’s belief 
is that having a full defence of psychological self-defence would merely legitimise the types of cases 
where the jury have been granting an acquittal, not because the facts met the legal requirements of 
self-defence, but because they were sympathetic towards the defendant’s situation, and believed 
the homicide was rightful retribution.233 He speculates that while such a defence might be difficult to 
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implement fairly, and would be open to abuse, this could be remedied by having the burden of proof 
be placed upon the defendant to minimise risk.234 
Domestic law has made such a provision for startled householders, but considering this premise as a 
partial defence, as Wake has endorsed, is a much more practical option.235 Given that grossly 
disproportionate force is more likely, particularly in the case of an abuser being killed when sleeping 
or off-guard, this lack of proportionality regarding a present threat does warrant some level of 
culpability. Whether as a complete or partial defence, the proposal of a psychological self-defence is 
a sound and attractive suggestion. It would certainly acknowledge the plight of battered women on 
a symbolic level. There is no plausible reason why ‘self’ should apply only to one’s physical being or 
body, with complete disregard for psychological attributes and processes. Mental health and 
psychological well-being are as important to a person as a limb. Just as a person would act to protect 
losing an arm, a battered woman reaches a point where she must act or risk losing her ‘self’ 
altogether. It is a practical need. It is possible the reason why many battered women who ultimately 
kill their abuser have previously attempted to commit suicide is because they feel they have no ‘self’ 
left to speak of, or there is no hope left for their ‘self’.236 Speaking of battered women who kill their 
abuser acting in this manner, Ewing stated: 
“They kill to prevent their batterers from seriously damaging, if not destroying, psychological 
aspects of the self which give meaning and value to their lives”.237 
If this statement is true, it should provide an excuse to homicide. The question is, does the first 
qualifying trigger of the new partial defence of loss of control cover this concept adequately? Fear of 
serious violence is not stipulated as being ‘physical’ violence, so it is safe to assume that this would 
also include mental, emotional or psychological abuse. Wake’s perception of a partial defence of 
psychological self-defence (or self-preservation) would equally include battered women, startled 
householders, and even cases like that of Clegg238. If the first qualifying trigger, a fear of serious 
violence, includes protection from either physical or psychological violence or abuse, then all three 
of these situations might amply be included, should the loss of self-control element be removed. 
X. Conclusion 
With the modern day societal awareness of violence and emotional abuse within relationships, this 
subject is no longer taboo, and therefore needs to be acknowledged within legal concepts and rules. 
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A decent and thorough understanding of intimate partner violence within the criminal justice system 
is vital to ensure both sexes are treated equitably before the law. There have been important 
advancements made for battered women by the creation of this new partial defence. Firstly, by 
swapping the word ‘characteristics’ for the word ‘circumstances’, and most importantly, accepting a 
fear of serious violence as a qualifying trigger. This advancement is further enhanced by the idea 
that this trigger might not only include physical violence, but psychological violence too. 
Unfortunately, the courts are yet to define fear and terror, or how they will fit within the all-
important loss of self-control element, which must be evident for the defence to apply. This remains 
troublesome. The overall concept is certainly a leap forward from the old provocation defence, but 
we have not come quite far enough. Hopefully, the recent advancements in regards to recognising 
coercive control within relationships and placing such behaviour in a criminal context will extend 
how we see the creation of terror.239 
It is now evident that battered woman syndrome does not serve these women well. It portrays a less 
than ideal stereotype240, and makes her an irrational being. After all, if her reaction to her situation 
includes a syndrome, it is unlikely it can be deemed as justifiable behaviour, or even excusable.241 
Justifiable behaviour is not merely tolerated, but actually encouraged242. Most unfortunate is her 
predicament to the point where she goes from being a victim of abuse to a victim of the state, her 
reactions misunderstood and the stigma of a conviction rather than acquittal to deal with243. We are 
yet to see how the courts will define fear and terror. It is always tempting to ask, if she was so afraid 
of the abuser and the violence, why she did not leave? Rather than focusing on this question, which 
should probably be irrelevant in the circumstances, we should instead ask if she was living with “a 
knife held above her head”244. A violent background does not excuse offending outright245, but 
unfortunately, it outwardly appears as though her choosing to stay in the relationship means the 
domestic violence must have been minimal, or at least tolerable. In such circumstances, we could 
not explicitly say her fear was reasonable. This seeming ‘duty’ of the woman to avoid the violence 
before the confrontation rather than taking action with a pre-emptive strike, seems unrealistic and 
excessive. We would not ask a man to avoid a particular bar because it is renowned for violence, and 
he may become involved in an altercation. A battered woman should be afforded the right to 
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protect not only her physical state, but her psychological state too, and the emotional control the 
abuser has over the abused in cases of domestic violence does not begin and end like a violent 
episode. It is continuous. Therefore, acting at any point to break free of the psychological prison a 
battered woman lives in might be deemed as an immediate reaction to grave conduct. Wells and 
Wake both promoted a theory of psychological self-defence,246 based on self-preservation, to form a 
new partial defence to murder. This is almost certainly akin to the fear of serious violence limb we 
have now, but without the problematic loss of control concept. 
The difficulty caused by the loss of self-control element to the new partial defence, which remains a 
quandary for these women, will therefore represent an obstacle to justice. As Norrie observes, the 
loss of self-control concept has remained, but compassion has not247. Not only this, but the concept 
still remains unexplained and indistinct – we are still unsure as to whether the defence operates for 
those who had an inability to control themselves, or merely failed to do so248. Its inclusion, at least in 
relation to the first limb of the new partial defence, seems redundant when considering not only 
that there are safeguards in place to prevent revenge killings249, but also the essence of the new law 
was to protect defendants acting from an emotion which does not tally with an instant frenzied 
attack. A much more relevant phrase to use with the fear of serious violence limb would be that the 
defendant’s actions were spontaneous, but not instantaneous250. Wells argued that the attempts of 
battered women to convert the provocation defence to meet their needs is “paradoxical”.251 It 
appears that with the loss of self-control concept still paramount for both qualifying triggers, this has 
not changed. As Hemming has noted, if there is no concession for compassionate killings, why 
should we have one for those borne of a loss of control?252 
There is much to be gained from continuously observing the reforms of other jurisdictions and their 
development through the courts. The Australian territories have certainly been making an effort to 
solve the provocation problem, albeit with several different solutions.  Queensland’s innovative 
legislation, opting to create a partial defence designed specifically for battered women who kill out 
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of self-preservation253, is an optimal pathway for achieving successful reform and should be praised 
for ingenuity. It is a shame that this unique parliamentary creation is applicable to only one type of 
emotion-driven killing, although it should be noted that the defence of provocation also exists in this 
territory, meaning other emotional-response killings, such as mercy killing, also have a chance at a 
successful partial defence.254The American Institute Model Penal Code’s notion of Extreme Mental 
and Emotional disturbance is fairly vague, but it embraces a wide range of emotions, and requires 
that only those feelings be reasonable, and not the actions they caused. For these reasons, it should 
be commended. The Law Commission described it as being preferable to a loss of self-control 
defence,255 and this was also remarked by Cairns.256 This partial defence is certainly a much more 
satisfactory way to deal with battered women who kill rather than trying to fit them into self-
defence, which often occurs,257 with some States even going as far as preparing guidelines for jury 
instruction in such cases.258  
Reed promotes extreme emotional distress as a partial defence, without a need for a loss of 
self-control, whilst still acknowledging that many more emotions than anger and fear would 
cause severe emotional turmoil:  
“ The emotional narrative in terms of disproportionate angry reaction to provoking 
stimuli, contextualisation of sexual humiliation or breach of trust, and even extreme 
grief, despair and frustration attached to witnessing the pain and suffering of a 
cherished individual, ought to be evaluated by the jury as moral arbiters”.259  
This is an attractive option for reform, recognising that trying to categorise all the emotions 
which might sufficiently adduce a partial defence is futile, whilst addressing the fair labelling 
problem adequately.  
In New Zealand, the Law Commission has realised that complete abolition of the partial 
defence of provocation was a mistake.260 It may be that if self-defence was more lenient in 
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New Zealand, especially in regards to the imminence requirement, this advancement would 
have been easier to swallow. As the decision of Wang261 proved, where the defendant killed 
her violent and abusive husband while he slept, this is not the case. With the strict application 
of self-defence, this situation is unacceptable, and gives new appreciation for domestic reform 
rather than a route of abolishing provocation along with the mandatory sentence for murder. 
This idea seems pragmatic at first glance, however, dealing with mitigating factors only at 
sentencing would mean that the conviction label would not reflect culpability, as we cannot 
stigmatize some without stigmatizing all. Wilson cogently sums up this dual demarcation:  
“Conviction-labels are as important as justice in the distribution of punishment. They 
identify distinctive wrongs underscored by corresponding social obligations”.262  
The only way to protect categories of defendants who are less culpable than others is through 
the partial defences. The place for these mitigations to be debated over is in front of a jury, not 
the sentencing judge. As Lacey notes,263 in modern society, there is a good, sound and well 
reasoned case not only for keeping the partial defences we have, but actually expanding them 
to cover the likes of mercy killing and excessive force self-defence.  
We have not quite grasped the nettle as well as Queensland, who fully take into account and 
appreciate the reality of a battered woman’s situation and reaction. However, we are on the same 
page as them, as opposed to other Australian territories, and the trend in the United States to allow 
these women an acquittal. We may be some way towards having a happy medium between the 
extremes of acquitting her when she did act in a way which should not be encouraged, yet still 
recognising the reality of human weakness, and her particular situation, by lessening the conviction 
from murder to manslaughter. Coupling this with lenient sentencing to reflect the circumstances is 
the best approach possible. Cases like these are the precise reason why the law needs ‘excuses’. 
Sometimes we just cannot manage to act in the most rational manner when confronted with an 
abnormal situation. There is no fair opportunity to do so. Even more important is to bear in mind 
that when under the influence of strong emotions, anyone can be dangerous, even battered 
women264. The provocation defence was fundamentally flawed, and the partial defence of loss of 
self-control is by no means perfect, but it does potentially make manslaughter an available outcome 
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for battered women who kill. Yet several barriers appear to remain before the path will be clear to 
justice, which would only be remedied by further reform. At the very least, the loss of control 
element to the defence will need to be removed to give battered women who kill the true path to 
justice they deserve. 
We have moved closer to being able to deliberate over a battered woman’s experiences when we 
consider her actions; this much is true. The step from characteristics to circumstances was certainly 
a victory for battered women killing the men who abuse them. Yet we still need to ask about the 
reasonableness of the victim: for example, whether or not a reasonable man would make his wife 
suffer such degradation.265 It is probably safe to say that, in this area, we have changed the scenery 
but not the situation. The first limb of the new partial defence is meant to be a solution to the 
battered woman dilemma, but instead we are still left with an anger related concept which will not 
meet the needs of those acting out of despair, fear or terror. Recognising and accrediting fear is 
crucial; it needs to be more than purely an academic exercise, appearing only by name and not by 
meaning in the new partial defence266. Regardless of which qualifying trigger a battered women 
pursues, we are still left with one remaining problem: loss of self-control. This needs to be remedied, 
and pathways to reform are available. Either removing loss of control from the current partial 
defence, or creating a new partial defence without it as Queensland have are without doubt the 
most attractive solutions available. It is imperative that such solutions become integrated into 
English law to continue the road to justice the Coroners and Justice Act has only begun to create. 
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